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This paper investigates the impact of banking sector consolidation on competition in the
Nigerian banking sector. The study evaluates the degree of competition using H-statistic
proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987), and bank level data from Bankscope to measure the
degree of competition before and after consolidation in the Nigerian banking sector. It was
concluded that while consolidation marginally improved competition, more needs to be
done to further improve competition in the sector. This finding suggests that policy makers
should continue to provide level playing field for all participants while simultaneously
working to promote stability concerns to support private sector activities and economic
growth in the country.
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I.

Introduction

A

major trend in the international financial markets in the last decade is

financial sector liberalization. This is based on the general realization that

protected market and the associated market power, created by

protection, is too costly for the local economy. The growing tendency was to
favour market mechanisms or regulatory liberalization and legislative authorities to
reap the efficiency gains associated with liberalization. One of the outcomes of
the financial sector reform is banking consolidation. Academics and policy makers
seem to unanimously accept the view that financial institutions play a crucial role
in the effective functioning of modern economies. Thus, suggesting that higher
degree of competition in the sector is crucial for financial intermediation and
economic growth. A competitive banking sector will be more efficient in terms of
allocating funds, more especially in operating as an intermediary between
depositors and borrowers. There have been considerable concerns about how
ongoing consolidation in financial systems around the world will affect
competition. Indeed, much of the recent public debate seems to assume that
perfect competition in banking is ideal and should be pursued.
* Ozoemena Nnaji is an Economist and Special Assistant to the Deputy Governor, Economic
Policy, Central Bank of Nigeria
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Competition in the banking sector has been at the crux of policy debates on
financial stability. As in other sectors, competition is usually seen as necessary for
an effective banking system as it affects the efficiency and the quality of services
offered in the industry. Furthermore, competition in banking has implications for
other sectors of the economy. Thus, higher competition in the banking sector is
found to be associated with a faster growth of other sectors of the economy that
rely on external financing (Claessens and Laeven, 2003). This is because banks
advance credit or loans to both firms and consumers and an uncompetitive
banking sector will lead to under-provision of such credit. Competition in the
banking sector will promote the efficiency required to create a fully functional
credit system, and according to the competition-stability theory, will help improve
the stability of the system. In addition, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) find that high
concentration in banking is negatively related to industrial growth in low-income
countries but not in high-income ones, suggesting that emerging economies need
a relatively more competitive banking sector in order to promote growth.
Banks are service industries. They contribute to economic growth not by producing
real goods, but by providing the financial services to facilitate production in other
industries. An efficient banking sector will make the largest contribution to
economic growth. Banks, like other firms, sell products to consumers, thus the need
to worry about the efficiency implication of a non-competitive banking sector.
Banks also act as conduits for monetary policy transmission mechanism; a low level
of competition in the banking sector may hinder the effectiveness of the conduct
of monetary policy as banks may not respond appropriately to monetary
tightening and/or easing (Van Leuvensteijn, et al, 2008).

There is ample evidence in the economic literature that competition in the
financial sector is a good thing and should be encouraged. However, the view
that competition in financial services is unambiguously good is a naive assumption
as recent events in the Us1 have called this assumption to question. Empirical
1

Many have argued that the global financial crisis which started in the United States and spread
around the world was as a result of liberalization and deregulation in the US financial system.
The policy debate in policy circle even in emerging economies is the issue of financial stability
and ways of safeguarding their financial system.
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evidence has also cautioned against excessive competition in the financial sector
on the ground that it could lead to instability. Specific to the financial sector is the
effect of excessive competition on financial stability, long recognized in
theoretical and empirical research and, most importantly, in the actual conduct of
(prudential) policy towards banks. It has been shown, theoretically and
empirically, that the degree of competition in the financial sector has implications
(negatively or positively) for access of firms and individual households to financial
services, and in turn overall economic growth. Therefore, competition has to be
considered as part of a broad set of objectives, including financial sector
efficiency, access to financial services for various segments of users, and systemic
financial sector stability, the possible trade-offs among these objectives. And since
competition depends on several factors, one has to consider a broad set of policy
tools when trying to increase competition in the financial sector. Thus, the role of
policy in striking a balance between competition and stability especially in an
emerging market like Nigerian becomes very important. While the goal of stability
should be the foremost objective of policy makers, competitive policies should not
be ignored. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the degree of competition in
the Nigerian banking sector and the contribution of the recent banking sector
consolidation in improving competition in the sector.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the literature on
competition theory in the banking sector. Section III presents an overview of the
Nigerian banking sector. Section IV elaborates on theoretical model of Panzar and
Rosse (1987) and some empirical evidence generated from their model. It presents
the data and the empirical model used in the analysis and the estimation results of
the H-statistic for the pre- and post-consolidation periods. Section V summarizes
the paper with some concluding remarks.

II.

Literature Review

Recent events have opened up debates on the role of market competition on the
banking sector. The common consensus is that restraining competitive forces in

48

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

Volume 49/1March 2011

the banking sector would produce welfare losses and should be avoided. Majority
opinion are of the view that banks with monopoly power would exercise their
ability to extract rents by charging higher loan rates to businesses and paying
depositors lower deposit rate. This will affect growth through many channels
including distortion or entrepreneurial incentive. There is a huge spread between
lending and deposit rates in the Nigerian financial market suggesting a
monopolistic banking structure2. By charging higher loan rate, banks in effect
distort entrepreneurial incentives.

In general, in a competitive environment, only the most efficient and innovative
firms survive, therefore, ensuring that the industry remains healthy and that firms
pass on the benefits of competition and innovation to their customers. In the
financial sector, there might be instances in which competition may have a
negative impact on stability, as the least efficient firms may have an incentive to
increase their risk in order to reach the industry profitability level. However, the
Nigerian financial sector is far from this scenario.

A number of methodological approaches have been used to investigate banking
competition. These can be divided into two: the Traditional Industrial Organization
Theory and the New Empirical Industrial Organizational Approaches. Within the
traditional method is the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) theory originated
by Mason (1939) and further popularized by Bain (1951). These models postulate
that market structure affects the behavior of firms in the market and hence, their
performance. It argues that higher concentration in banking markets causes less
competitive bank conduct and leads to higher bank profitability, or lower deposit
rate in the deposit market. Although, this approach was criticized for taking market
structure as given, it dominated competitive analysis until the 1970s when Demsetz
(1973) developed the efficiency Structure theory. The X-efficiency model argued
that the positive relationship between market concentration and profitability does
not hold because of market power, but is a consequence of the greater efficiency

2

See data from the Financial Market Dealers Association of Nigeria, www.fmda.com.ng.
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of firms with the largest market share. Banks with superior management and/or
production technologies enjoy higher profits and as a result, have more market
share. Alternatively, some banks may produce at more efficient scales than others
in their industry, leading to higher profit and higher market concentration. Some
empirical studies have found evidence supporting the efficiency hypothesis (See
Berger, et al. 1995).
The SCP and X-efficiency theories formed the basis for the structural models used in
the measure of bank competition today from which the Contestable theory is
derived from. The contestable market theory was developed by Baumol, Panzar
and Willig (1982). They defined a contestable market as one in which entry and exit
is free and costless. The market structure is determined explicitly and
simultaneously by output and prices. Whatever industry structures that minimize
total cost for the equilibrium output vector must be the only structure consistent
with the industry equilibrium in the long run. This theory offers analytical methods for
empirical research in banking competition. Panzar and Rosse (1987) presented a
reduced form revenue approach using bank level data to distinguish between
market structures. The PR methodology investigates the degree of competition by
examining the extent to which changes in factor inputs are reflected in equilibrium
industry or bank-specific revenues.
In summary, the literature on the measurement of competition can be broadly
divided into two branches: the (non-formal) structural approach and the (formal)
non-structural approach. The structural approach centers on the StructureConduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) or the efficiency hypothesis, according to
what they assume to be the main reason for superior market performance. For the
SCP, the collusive behavior among large firms due to a highly concentrated
market is the main driver of market over performance. On the other hand, the
efficiency hypothesis, implicitly assumes the presence of economies of scale
through which large firms achieve increased efficiency and improved
performance. Thus, if a firm is more efficient than the rest (e.g., due to a lower cost
structure) it could gain market share by reducing prices (Molyneux and Forbes,
1995) and hence, market structure is endogenously shaped by firms´ performance
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so that concentration is a result of the superior efficiency of the leading firms (See
Vesala, 1995).

Other offshoots of the approach that is designed to measure the degree of
competition introduced by Bresnahan (1982), Iwata (1974) exist and are often
referred to as the conjectural variations approach. This method is based on the
idea that a bank when choosing its output takes into account the “reactions” of
rival banks. Thus, it investigates the degree of competition by examining the
conjectural elasticity of total banking industry output to a variation in the output of
bank i- the perceived response of industry to a change in the quantity of a specific
bank. Empirical research has used this approach and a discussion of the Panzar
and Rosse model is presented below.

New developments in industrial organization and the refinement of formal models
of imperfectly competitive markets, as well as the realization of the need to
endogenize market structure have led recent empirical work to rely increasingly
on non-structural models. In particular, the application of the SCP in the banking
literature has been criticized for the one-way causality (from market structure to
market performance) that the original model imposed. There are three main nonstructural models proposed in the literature: Iwata's (1974), Bresnahan's (1982) and
Panzar and Rosse's (1987) models. Of these, Iwata's model has not yet been
applied to the banking industry, due to the lack of micro data needed for
empirical estimation. Empirical applications of Bresnahan's model are also
relatively scarce for developing countries. There are a number of papers that
apply this model to the Latin American banking sector. Variations of Bresnahan's
conjectural variation approach find competitive markets in Colombia (Barajas, et
al, 1999), Brazil (Nakane, 2001) and Argentina (Burdisso, et al., 2001).

The basic idea is that profit-maximization firms in equilibrium will choose prices and
quantities such that marginal costs equal their marginal revenue. This will coincide
with the demand price under perfect competition and industry's marginal revenue
under perfect collusion. This measure varies between full market power to perfect
competition at the extreme spectrum.

Nnaji: Measuring Competition in the Nigerian Banking Sector

51

Many studies have been conducted using different methods to find the level of
competition in the banking sector of numerous countries across the world. Most
studies applied the Panzar and Rosse approach. Perera, et al. (2006) used the
Panzar and Rosse approach on some developing Asian countries including
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and found the banking sector in
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan to be monopolistic or monopolistic competitive
with H- statistics of 0.68, 0.64 and 0.48, respectively. The banking sector in Sri Lanka
was, however, found to be more of a competitive structure with H-statistic of 0.71.
Additionally, Claessens and Laeven (2003) applied the Panzar and Rosse method
on fifty countries around the world, of which thirty one are developing countries
(including Nigeria). The result of the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic from the study
showed that most developing countries' banking sectors feature between the
range of monopolistic and monopolistic competitive structure3. Using this method
for the Jordanian banking sector and data from 1994 to 2006, Demirguc-Kunt and
Martinez-Peria (2010) found that the banking sector in Jordan had become more
monopolistic due to greater evidence of market power and, hence, a lower
degree of competition in that country's banking sector as the number of banks
reduced.

III.

Banking Sector Performance after Consolidation

The Nigerian banking system has undergone remarkable changes over the years,
in terms of the number of institutions, ownership structure, as well as depth and
breadth of operations. These changes have been induced largely by challenges
posed by deregulation of the financial sector, globalization of operations,
technological innovations and adoption of supervisory and prudential
requirements that conform to international standards. As at end-June 2004, there
were 89 deposit money banks operating in the country, comprised of institutions of
various sizes and degrees of soundness. Structurally, the sector was highly
concentrated, as the ten largest banks account for about 50 percent of the
industry's total assets/liabilities (see IMF 2008 article IV report on the Nigeria Banking
sector).
3

Also see Buchs and Mathise and Claessens and Laeven (2003)
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Most banks had capitalization of less than US$10 million, with the largest bank
having a capital base of about US$240. The small size of most of the banks, each
with expensive headquarters, separate investment in software and hardware,
heavy fixed costs and operating expenses, and with bunching of branches in few
commercial centers, led to a very high average cost for the industry. This in turn has
implications for the cost of financial intermediation, the spread between deposit
and lending rates, and exerts undue pressures on banks to engage in unethical
practices as means of survival. Industry analysts were of the opinion that most of
the banks were not engaged in strict banking business of financial intermediation;
rather, they resorted to quick-business kind of deals and ignored the main function
of financial intermediation (e.g. foreign exchange dealings, lending the oil
imports, etc.).
a

Table 1: Indicators of Banking Performance after Consolidation
Pre-Consolidation

Post-Consolidation

89
3382
24
85
59
5

24
4500
51.1
98
61
25

Number of Banks
No. of Branches
Total Asset of Banks (US$ billion)
Loan to Deposit Ratio
Cash Reserve Ratio
Capital Requirements (Naira billion)

Source: Annual Report of the Banking Supervision Department, Central Bank of Nigeria
Based on 2009 data

a

The sector was marred by a lot of challenges, including, weak corporate
governance, evidenced by high turnover in the Board and management staff,
inaccurate reporting and non-compliance as well as regulatory requirements (as
evidenced by the CBN forensic investigation done on in 2009 which resulted in the
sack of management staff from 9 banks).

Based on this, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) embarked on the consolidation of
the banking system that reduced the number of banks from 89 to 25 and raised the
capital requirement from N5 to N25 billion. 19 of the banks emerged through
mergers and acquisition among 69 banks, while 6 of the banks raised additional
capital to meet the new capital requirement. Majority of the banks were under
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private domestic ownership with the exception of 3 foreign-owned banks
operating in the country (Citibank, Stanbic and Standard Chartered). Following
the consolidation, banks' balance sheets expanded, most of them venturing into
universal banking and expanded cross-border transaction into other African
countries, United States and Europe. Credit to the private sector equally increased
and all other developmental indicators of the banking sector increased as a result
of the consolidation exercise. Financial sector depth (measured by M2/GDP ratio)
and intermediation into the private sector (measured by credit to the private
sector/GDP) increased substantially (See Table 2 and Figure 1).

Table 2: Indicators of Financial Development in Nigeria, 2004-2009
Private Sector
Credit/GDP
21
22
21
31
37
40

M2/GDP
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
June 20094

19.8
19.3
19.8
28
37
44

Total NPL

M1/M2

21.9
21.6
18.2
8.76
6.3
6.6

32
29
25
20
16
18

Sources: CBN data and IMF FSI database, 2009

Figure 1: Financial Development Indicators from Nigerian Banking Sector
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40%
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10,431

8,000
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25%
20%
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10%

6,738

6,000

4,389
2,767

50%
45%

10,000

3,392

2006

2007
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Private sector credit/M2

Year on Year change in Bank Assets/GDP
Change in Bank Assets/GDP
36%

18%

19%

18%

2003

2004

2005

43%

20%

5%
0%

2,000
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008
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2007

2008

Sources: CBN Annual Reports, various years, author's estimate

4

Signs of distress in the banking sector are already starting to show as the second round effect of
the financial crisis affected the balance sheet of some of the banks.
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Credit extension boomed and private sector activities boosted economic growth,
underpinned by buoyant oil and non-oil commodity prices5.

There was a

reduction in net interest rate margins driven mainly by reduction in large corporate
business and a reduction in Treasury bill rates. Banking sector profitability also
declined. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) declined suggesting a
more competitive and efficient system.

The banks expanded their balance sheet by more than 60 percent as public
confidence in the sector bolstered, evidenced by the increase in deposits. As a
result of this growth in the balance sheet and larger capital base, banks were
under intense pressure to utilize the funds to provide adequate return to
shareholders. The banks established subsidiaries and extended credits in new
areas that were previously off limit because of the level of funds required6. The
banks funded large ticket items that they were not able to fund under the previous
capital base. They moved into new untapped areas, banking the unbanked and
expanded branch networks. The number of bank branches increased from about
3000 to about 5134 by mid-2009. The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans
declined from 18.1 percent post-consolidation to 6.2 at the peak in 2008 and 8.36 in
mid-2009 (See Table 2). What happened to competition in the sector?

IV.

The Panzar and Rosse Analytical Framewok

In this paper, Panzar and Rosse's (PR) approach is used, which has the advantage
of using bank specific data and, therefore, allows control for variables of interest
such as size and foreign ownership. The Panzar and Rosse (1977), expanded by
Panzar and Rosse (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology uses firm level
(bank level) data. It investigates the extent to which a change in factor input prices
is reflected in (equilibrium) revenues earned by a specific bank. Specifically, the PR H statistics is calculated using reduced form of bank revenue equations and
measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of the bank with respect to
the bank's input prices.
5

The global financial crisis and the subsequent decline in the global food and fuel prices have tempered the
growth prospects and prompted the Central Bank to intervene in some banks to maintain financial stability.
6

Areas such as oil exploration, infrastructure and construction
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According to the Panzar-Rosse methodology, it is not just the size of the H-statistics
that matters, but its magnitude as well. Under a monopolistic structure, an increase
in input prices P will increase marginal cost, thus reducing equilibrium output y* and
revenue, thereby implying that the H-statistics value be less or equal to zero. In
contrast, in a perfectly competitive setting in the long-run, an increase in input
prices P will increase marginal cost as well as average costs by the same
proportion, without under certain assumption changing the equilibrium output of
banks. As inefficient banks are forced to exit the market, the increased demand
faced by the remaining banks leads to an increase in output prices and revenues
in the same proportion as costs, thus implying a H-statistics value of unity. In the
case of monopolistic competition, an increase in input prices P will lead to a less
than proportional increase in revenue as the demand for bank loans is inelastic. In
this case, H-statistics will lie between 0 and 1.

Table 3: Interpretations of the Panzar and Rosse's H-statistic
Values of H-statistics

Implied Market Structure

H≤ 0

Monopoly
Colluding oligopoly, conjectural variations of oligopoly

0 < H< 1

Monopolistic Competition

H=1

Perfect Competition
Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market

The PR approach has been used in several studies that test competition for the
European banking industry and emerging markets' banking sector (Buchs and
Mathisen, 2005; Claessen and Leaven, 2003). More recently, the approach has
also been applied to emerging markets' banking system and in large cross country
studies7 (Table 4 presents a survey of the main results using this approach).

The test is derived from a general banking model which determines equilibrium
output and the equilibrium number of banks by maximizing profits at both the bank
level and the industry level. Two critical implications exist for this equilibrium model.
The first is that at the bank level, profit maximization is assumed
7

For example see Claessens and Leaven (2003) used the model to study competition in 50 countries
including Nigerian banking system before banking consolidation.
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R i is the marginal revenue function, C i is the marginal cost function yi is the output of
bank i, k is the number of banks and vi and qi are exogenous variables that shift the
bank's revenue and cost function while fi is a vector of bank i's factor input prices.
All of the variables are expressed in log form. This also implies that the zero profit
constraint holds at the industry level.

Table 4: Studies that Applied Panzar Rosse Model to Banking Industry
Author

Period

Shafer (1982)
Nathan and
Neave (1989)
Lloyds-William et al
(1991)
Molyneux et al.
(1994)
Vesala (1995)
Bikker and
Groeneveld (2000)
Coccorese (1998)
Rime (1999)
De Brandt and
Davis (1999)

1979
1982-84

Banking sector
Studied
New York
Canada

1986-88

Japan

Monopolistic competition
Perfect Competition (1982); monopolistic
completion (1983-1984)
Monopoly

1986-89

France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, UK
Finland
EU- 15 countries

Monopoly (Italy); Monopolistic competition
(France, Germany, Spain and UK)
Monopolistic competition
Monopolistic competition

1988-96
1987-94
1992-96

Italy
Switzerland
France, Germany,
Italy

Jiang, (2004)
Cleassens and
Leaven (2004)

1992-2002
1994-2001

Buchs and
Mathisen (2005)
Pasadila and Milo
(2006)
Greenberg and
Simbanegavi
(2009)

1989-2003

Hong Kong
50 industrialized
and developing
countries
Ghana

Monopolistic competition
Monopolistic Competition
Large banks: Monopolistic competition in all
countries; Small Banks: Monopoly in France
and Germany and Monopolistic
competition in Italy.
Monopolist competition
Monopolistic competition (with larger
countries having tending to have lower
competition)
Monopoly

1995-99

Philippines

1992-2007

South Africa

1985-92
1989-96

Results

Large banks: Monopolistic competition;
Small banks perfect competition
Large Bank: perfect competition; Small
banks: Monopolistic competition

Source: Claessens and Laeven, 2005, Perera (2006) and author's compilations

Thus the H-statistic is formulated as:
n æ ¶R fi ö
H = å i= 0 ç
÷
è ¶fi Ri ø

(2)

The intuition behind the interpretation of H-statistic rest on economic theory, which
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explains how income or revenue reacts to changes in input prices for different
market structure.

Under monopolistic competition, the change in input prices is

greater than the change in revenue, thus H-statistic is expected to be smaller than
one but greater than zero. Under perfect competition, the change in input prices
leads to an equal change in revenue, therefore H-statistic is expected to be equal
to one (see Table 3 above). The P-R method shows that large H values imply a
continuous measure of competition.

Two approaches, the “production approach” and the “intermediation
approach” have been used in empirical literature in measuring banking sector
competition. In this paper, the intermediation approach, which classifies deposits
and loan as inputs and output, respectively, is used.

IV.1

The Empirical Model

Following Bikker and Haaf (2002), the reduced form revenue model is as follows:

ln( Rit ) = a + b 1 ln U PLi t + b 2 ln U PFit + b 3 ln U PCit + g ln RC1it +
g ln R C 2 it + d ln CU SD EPit
(3)
where Rit is the ratio of gross interest revenue (or total revenue) to total assets (proxy
for output price of loans), UPLit is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets
(proxy for input price of labor), UPFit is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits
(proxy for input price of deposits), and UPC it is the ratio of other operating and
administrative expenses to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed
capital). We also include a set of exogenous and bank-specific variables that may
shift the revenue schedule. Specifically, RC1it is the ratio of non-performing loans,
and RC2 it is the ratio of net loans to total assets and CUSDEP is the ratio of customer
deposit to total deposits. All of these variables are in logs, with the coefficients
representing their respective elasticities.

Based on the model above, the H-

statistics can be represented as the sum of:

H = b1 + b 2 + b 3

(4)

This measure is based on the idea that competitive firms are price takers and must
pass through cost changes to customers, while monopoly can vary output to
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maximize profit in the face of higher input prices.

IV.2

Data Description and Definition of Variables

Annual individual bank level data from Bankscope of 19 out of the 24 deposit
money banks (DMBs) in operation from 2000 to 2008 was used. Some banks were
dropped due to data unavailability as some of the banks did not exist as an entity
prior to the banking consolidation exercise. Given that the data used in the study is
from the same industry, operating in the same environment, a common effect
model was chosen for the estimation presented in the paper. A panel unbalanced
regression was run on pooled cross-section of the 19 banks. All variable used in the
regression are in logged form. Specifically, the variables are defined as follows:

The H-statistic test is defined as the sum of the elasticities of equation (3) with
respect to input prices (that is, the linear combination of the coefficients (β1 + β2 +
β3 ), which are presented along with their joint standard error (SE). In order to test
whether there has been a statistically significant increase in competition, the
results of the estimation for the pre- consolidation and post-consolidation periods
are presented alongside each other with a Wald test of equality of the H-statistics
for the two periods. Hausman test suggested that there were no bank-specific
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effects, as all banks were operating in the same environment.

IV.3.

Estimation Results

The estimation result shows that while consolidation slightly improved the
competitive nature of the banking system under the Panzar-Rosse model, the
system was not overly competitive. The H-statistics lie between 0 and 1 (see Table
5). Before consolidation, the H-statistics ranged between .45 and .56 depending
on the variable included in the study. However, the post-consolidation H-statistics
ranged from 0.52 to 0.62, suggesting that consolidation slightly increased
competition in the Nigerian banking system, but not to an unhealthy level. This is just
with a limited time data after the exercise. A longer term data may likely find higher
competition ratio than is currently reported. Consolidation moved the Nigerian
Banking sector further in the monopolistically competition region.

This market structure is consistent and similar to what is obtained in similar markets.
Studies of the Ghanaian and Kenyan banking sector suggest that they too have Hstatistics of .56 and .58 respectively (see Buchs and Mathisen, 2005; Claessens and
Laeven, 2003). However, the South African banking sector was found to be more
competitive than the Nigerian banking sector, with H-statistics of .75 for all banks
and .97 for large banks. Consolidation improved competition slightly allowing
banks to perform the important intermediation function of credit extension and
other services that promoted economic activities and ultimately growth but not
without some imperfection in the system.

The coefficients of the unit prices of labor, capital and funds are all positive,
implying the increased factor cost leading to higher revenue for banks. The unit
price of labor (UPL) is statistically significant in all specifications with comparable
positive elasticities. This suggests that personnel costs are as important as overhead
costs, which are relatively high in Nigeria. The over-head cost of the banks
operating in Nigeria are relatively high as they have to provide services like power
and security, services that are normally public goods provided by the government.
8

See Greenberg and Simbanegavi, (2004) “Testing for Competition in the South African Banking Sector”
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The dilapidated state of infrastructure is hampering the competitive nature of the
banking system.

The unit cost of funds (UPF) is significant in all specifications and has a higher impact
on interest revenue than other revenue in the post-consolidation period, probably
reflecting the better market responsiveness of the present system. The unit cost of
fixed assets (UPC) is a determinant of total revenue, but not of total interest
revenue, which may be partly explained by the importance of private money
transfers and investment costs (e.g., in ATMs and branches), that were incurred
during the period, for which revenues are fee-based.

The non-performing loans ratio (RC1) has a statistically significant positive effect
both in the pre-consolidation and post-consolidation period, although the
magnitude in post-consolidation is smaller, suggesting that while progress is being
made in the cleanup of non-performing loans, more needs to be done in that
regard to improve competition in the system.
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Conclusion

Competition is as important in banking as in any other industry. Competition has
implications for efficiency, innovation, pricing, availability of choice, consumer
welfare, and the allocation of resources in the economy. The functions of the
banking system,

including providing a payments and settlements system,

mechanisms for borrowing and lending, and pooling and allocation of funds,
among others, impinge on all aspects of the economy and are central to the
overall performance of the economy. The efficacy of the financial system in
performing these functions is a major ingredient of the efficacy of the economy as
a whole. Given the pivotal role of banking in an economy, the role of competition
in this industry is particularly important. Banks are important for economic
development. Therefore, it is imperative that the banking sector faces a
reasonable level of competition. This will both help to create a fully functioning
credit system as well as strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy. Banks
contribute to economic growth not by producing real goods, but by providing the
financial services to facilitate production in other industries. A competitive and
efficient banking sector will make the largest contribution to economic growth.

This paper has used the P-R methodology to test for the level of competition in the
Nigerian banking sector, before and after banking consolidation exercise. The
study suggests that consolidation improved competition only slightly and that
competitive policies should continue to remain a focus of policy objective in the
Nigerian financial sector to promote economic growth and to create an inclusive
financial sector that is able to perform its intermediation functions.
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